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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES J. ~IILLIGAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
CAPITOL FURNITURE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, et al., 
Defendants and Respondent.:;. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 8777 
PRELIMINARY STATE~1:ENT 
Appellant will be referred to throughout this brief 
as he appeared below, namely, plaintiff. Respondent will 
be referred to by name where necessary, or simply a;-; 
defendant. All italics are ours. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is from the order of the trial court enter-
ing judgment of "no cause of action" following the sub-
Inission of plaintiff's case to the jury on a special verdict. 
The special verdict submitted seven questions to 
the jury for their answers. The questions and answers 
given were as follows: 
Question I. Did the defendants maintain a down-
spout drainage system which was negligently con-
structed~ 
Answer: No. 
Question I I. Was the manner in which the down 
spout was constructed a proximate cause of plain-
tiff's fall~ 
Answer : ------------------------
Question I I I. Did the defendants negligently 
allow water from the down spout to run onto the 
sidewalk and form ice? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question IV. \Vas such negligence a proximate 
cause of plaintiff's fall? 
Answer: Yes. 
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Question V. Was plaintiff negligent in walking 
across the ice where he fell¥ 
Answer: Yes. 
Question VI. Was such negligence a proximate 
cause of plaintiff's fall¥ 
Answer: No. 
Question VII. As shown by a preponderance of 
the evidence in this case, what amount of money 
would fairly and adequately recompense the plain-
tiff for any .and all injuries he sustained as a re-
sult of his falling on the ice as set forth in Instruc-
tion No. 15? 
Answer: $5,000.00. 
The Jury verdict of $5,000.00 did not take into ac-
count the special damages which were for medical and 
hospital expenses. The specials amounts to $1123.00 
(R. 148). The total judgment which the plaintiff would 
be entitled to is, therefore, $6,123.00. 
Following the return of the verdict of the Jury 
plaintiff moved the Honorable Court for the entry of 
Judgment on behalf of the plaintiff for $6,123.00. De-
fendant moved the Court for entry of judgment on behalf 
of defendant "no cause of action." The matter was argued 
and the Court ordered Judgment "no cause of action" 
entered (H. 149-150). Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion 
for t"n t r~· of judgment, or in the alternative, for a new 
trial (R. 15fi-157). The rnotion was denied (R. 158). 
Plaintiff then perfected his appeal. 
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The evidence revealed during the trial that plaintiff 
at about 4:45 P.:M:. on the 5th day of February, 1956, 
while walking along on the south side of Second South 
Street, at approximately 561 West, attempted to cross 
over .a sheet of ice covering the sidewalk; that as he 
started across the ice he fell and suffered a fracture of 
the iliurn of his right leg and miscellaneous bruises and 
abrasions. For several months following the injury 
plaintiff wa.s completely disabled and incurred the 
$1123.00 in rnedical and hospital expenses. 
The ice covering the sidewalk came onto the side-
walk as result of a drain pipe from the roof of the build-
ing at 561 West 2nd South Street, being clogged and per-
mitting the n1elted water from the roof of the building to 
drain out onto the sidewalk. 
The jury in the answer to Question No. 3 of the 
special verdict found that the defendants negligently 
allowed the water from the downspout to run onto the 
sidewalk and formed the ice. They also found that this 
was a proximate cau.se of plaintiff's fall. 
The Rules of Civil Procedure specifically cover the 
right of the Court to subn1it to a Jury special verdicts. 
Rule 49 (b) covers the situation which exists when an-
swers to interrogatories are inconsistent with the general 
verdict or with each other. That portion of Rule 49 (b) 
applie.able reads as follows: 
"\Vhen the answers are consistent with each 
other but one or more is inconsistent with the 
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general verdict, the court may direct the entry 
of judgment in accordance with the answers, not-
withstanding the general verdict or may return 
the jury for further consideration of its answers 
and verdict or may order a new trial. When the 
an.swers .are inconsistent with each other and one 
or more is likewise inconsistent with the general 
verdict, the court shall not direct the entry of 
judgment but may return the jury for further con-
sideration of its answers and verdict or may order 
a new trial." 
The basic question presented by this appeal is the 
proper course for the trial court to follow where the 
answers of the jury reveal that a party was negligent 
but that the negligence was not a proximate cause of his 
injury. 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN ENTERED ON THE SPECIAL VERDICT OF THE 
JURY. 
POINT II. 
IF THE ANSWERS TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT QUES-
TIONS ARE INCONSISTENT A NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED PLAINTIFF. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE REVEALS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS 
NOT .CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
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POINT IV. 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND 
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN SUBMITTING THE SPECIAL 
VERDICT TO THE JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN ENTERED ON THE SPECIAL VERDICT OF THE 
JURY. 
The Special Verdict rendered by the Jury indicates 
that while there was something in the nature of negli-
gence which plaintiff did, the Jury did not think that the 
negligence was the proximate cause of his injury. Just 
what the Jury had in mind .as being negligence is a matter 
of pure speculation. 
This Court will not be given the opportunity of seeing 
plaintiff. He was a large, tall disjointed type of person 
whose bodily movements were themselves such as would 
suggest a looseness of action. It may be that the jury 
thought that Mr. Milligan's gait, or manner of walking 
was .a negligent manner of walking. Something, he alone 
is afflicted with in the nature of a personal idiosyncrasy. 
Whatever the Jury thought, if they followed the instruc-
tions of the Court, and it must be presumed that they did, 
they did not think it caused his fall. It is respectfully 
~u b1ni tted that the Court is bound by the determination 
that whatever negligenre he was guilty of did not cause 
his injuries. 
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The law seems to be clear to the effect that in order 
for negligence of a plaintiff to bar his recovery the negli-
gence must be a proximate cause of the injury. An excel-
lent case illustrating the law, Friedman v. Pacific Out-
door Advertising Co., 74 C. Ap. 2d 946, 170 P. 2d 67. 
An additional California case, directly in point, is N el-
son v. Colbeck, 94 C. A. 2d 792,211 P. 2d 878. 
The Inost recent Utah decision, discussing the kind 
of negligence necessary to bar recovery is Ray v. Con-
solidated Freightways, Inc., 4 U. 2d 137, 289 P. 2d 196. 
This Court placed the burden on the defendant to 
show not only plaintiffs negligence but that it was a 
substantial factor contributing to the injury and damage 
suffered. vVhether the burden has been sustained must be 
left to the Jury for its determination. Stickle v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Company, 122 U. 477, 251 P. 2d 867. 
To the same effect is the recent case of McDonald 
v. Linick, et al., ______ N. M. ______ , 265 P. 2d 132. 
It is respectfully submitted that since the Jury found 
that the negligence of plaintiff was not a proximate cause 
of his injury judgment should have been entered for 
plaintiff for the amount of damages found. 
POINT IL 
IF THE ANSWERS TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT QUES-
TIONS ARE INCONSISTENT A NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED PLAINTIFF. 
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The answers to Questions 5 and 6 are not inconsistent 
one with another and are not inconsistent with the gen-
eral verdict in favor of plaintiff and against defendant 
Negligence may occur which does not cause injury. 
The Trial Court considered the answers to questions 
5 and 6 to be inconsistent with each other. It ruled as 
matter of law that the negligence found in Question No.5 
was the proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff. His 
ruling set aside the answer the Jury made to Question 
No. 6, that the negligence was not a proximate cause. 
Rule 49 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
"When the answers are inconsistent with each 
other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with 
the general verdict the Court shall not direct the 
entry of judgment but may return the Jury for 
further consideration of its answers and verdict, 
or may order a new trial." 
The trial court did not return the jury for further 
consideration of its answers .and did not order a new trial, 
but instead resolved the inconsistency in favor of the 
defendant. 
Assu1ning for the purpose of this argu1nent that the 
answers then are inconsistent one with another. "'\Vhich 
answer shall the Court accept and enter judgment upon? 
It would appear obvious to plaintiff that to choose one 
of the .answers and enter judgment on that answer would 
be to detennine factual rnatters ·within the province of 
the .Jury only. 
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There is nothing about the answers which would 
make the trial court's decision necessary. It is sub1nitted 
that it could be equally rea,sonable for the Court to have 
held that the only negligence the evidence revealed that 
plaintiff could be guilty of would necessarily be a proxi-
mate cause. Therefore, the negligence found was not a 
proximate cause could only mean that the Jury found 
negligence not supported by evidence or negligence with 
no relationship to the damage and injury which the plain-
tiff suffered. 
It is not within the province of the trial court to de-
cide the facts where there is substantial evidence to sup-
port a jury finding. To resolve the inconsistent answers, 
if such they be, necessarily requires the trial court to 
make a finding on factual matters. 
The reasons behind Rule 49(b) would seem to be that 
it would require the trial ocurt to pass on factual matters 
where answers .are inconsistent. Therefore, the trial 
court is not permitted to enter a judgment under such 
circumstances but must return the jury to consider its 
answers further, or order a new trial. 
In the case of Welch et al. v. Bower, 186 F. 2d 1002, 
the basic question was answered exactly as suggested 
by plaintiff. The holding reads as follows : 
" ( 3) We cannot agree, though, that defend-
ants were entitled to a judgment on the verdict 
and that the judgment should be reversed and here 
rendered for them. The answer to the special 
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issue is completely inconsistent with the general 
verdict. This being so, this is a case in which, 
under Rule 49, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 28 U.S.C.A. 
the answer to the special issue being inconsistent 
with the general verdict, the eourt could not enter 
a judgment on it, but must either return the case 
to the jury for further consideration of its an-
swers, or grant a new trial. Since he did not re-
turn the case to the jury he should have ordered 
a new trial." 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that if the answers 
are inconsistent and the trial court is correct in so de-
tennining, then the only course remaining to be followed 
is that the case be returned and a new trial ordered. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE REVEALS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS 
NOT ·CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
The evidence concerning the care exercised by plain-
tiff in proceeding along the sidewalk in an easterly di-
rection crune only frmn hin1self and the witnesses, Louis 
Johnson and Alex Geros. ~Ir. !iilligan stated as fol-
lows, concerning the condition which he observed prior 
to his fall: 
"Q. What did you notice, ~Ir. :Milligan, about the 
sidewalk then when you-when its condition 
changed~ 
A. Where I noticed the condition on the side-
walk, where the ice had piled up over the 
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-there was a big steel door there. The ice 
and snow w.as all up into there, and I had 
taken and walked down where I thought was 
a clean good walk, and just as quick as I hit 
that with Iny foot, it went right out just like 
that in a second bef·ore you could even think 
Q. What did you observe about the place that 
you actually stepped on~ What was its con-
dition~ 
A. vVell, I thought at the time, I didn't know 
it was as slick as it was underneath. I couldn ~t 
see it was as slick as it was, but I thought it 
was a safe place to walk. 
Q. And after you fell, did you discover some-
thing different about~ 
A. Well, I found I couldn't get up. I found under-
neath it was just as slick as glass underneath 
there. It was awfully slick. 
Q. vVhat made it slick~ 
A. It was the water down spout I imagine was 
run off there and turned real cold. 
:MR. HAYES: Just moment. I object to a 
conclusion of the witness as to what he imagines. 
THE COURT: The objection will be sustain-
ed. You may tell us what you found, what you 
saw there. 
A. Oh. Ice underneath the snow on the sidewalk 
was very slick, and I couldn't get up. 
fl. i\lr. _i\lilligan, that ice, how far did it extend 
on the sidewalk~ 
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A. I didn't measure that. I didn't measure it. I 
would imagine it was over the sidewalk, but 
I did not-
Q. Well, now, the word 'imagine' is a word that 
is very offensive in court. Imagination has 
no place. Tell us what you saw concerning 
the extent of ice that covered the sidewalk 
where you fell. 
A. Well, I just saw the ice and little what I 
thought was a skiff of snow, and I went to go 
around on the other into the center of where 
the traffic looked like to me was safe, and as 
I went over that, I just stepped into that, and 
my foot went right out from under me, and 
I would say that it was, oh, space of about 
ten or twelve feet." 
Witness Lewis Johnson, concerning the extent of 
ice on the sidewalk, stated as follows: 
"Q. How n1uch of the sidewalk "\vas covered with 
ice~ 
A. \Yell, from the building out to the curb I 
would say approximately eight feet wide; 
could be n1ore. 
Q. Did you notice anything about the front of 
the building there and the down spout~ 
A. Yes. It was covered with ice. 
Q. "\ Vhere did the ice start on that down spout~ 
A. \Vell, it was up at the top. The front of the 
building was covered with ice all down by the 
spout." (p. 100) 
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Witness Alex Geros stated: 
"Q. And where was the ice~ 
A. Right in the drain pipe. 
Q. Around the drain pipe~ 
A. Around the drain pipe. 
Q. And about how far out did it extend~ 
A. Well, I imagine-I got a stick just for fun, 
yard stick. There was two sticks square. 
Q. Two feet square 1 
A. No, I don't know how far-about three feet. 
I don't know how far. How long is the stick, 
yard stick~ Three feet supposed to be. 
Q. Yard stick. 
A. Yard stick. 
Q. About three feet then~ 
A. Yes, must be three feet. 
Q. Now, past the end of the yard stick was there 
ice, or was the sidewalk clearf 
A. Clear." (p. 117) 
On Page 120: 
"Q. Now, that ice that was three and a half inches 
deep was right against the buildingf 
A. No, in the pipe, around the pipe. 
Q. Around the pipe~ 
A. Around the pipe. 
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Q. And did the ice extend up the face of that 
building, do you remember? 
A. The face, the pipe extend-
Q. The ice, did it come up the drain pipe, up 
the face of the building? 
A. Yes, like I told you, yes." 
On page 122: 
"Q. Can you see the iron doors there right under 
your thumb? You see the iron doors there~ 
A. Yes, iron door here. 
Q. When the ice colleots on the sidewalk there at 
the bottom of the drain spout, it comes over 
on the iron door, does it? 
A. Right here, yes. 
Q. And then when it melts, does it run out across 
the sidewalk, Mr. Geros, out to the curb and 
off into the curb when that snow or when 
that ice at the bottom of the drain pipe melts~ 
A. 'Yell, part i~ straight and together and part 
spreads all over. 
Q. It spreads all oyer. does it, so that if there 
had been a little of that water Inelt, it would 
spread all over the ~idewalk and would run 
off. You ~rP this crack in the edge of the 
f'idrwalk there. Doesn't the water when it 
frrP:t.Pf' around the bottom of the drain pipe 
and then 1nelts run off and run off into tlw 
g-utter about that point -
A. rrhat is a drain :-;('Wl'l'. 
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Q. -and across the top of the sidewalk~ Doesn't 
the water when ice melts at the bottom of 
the drain pipe run out across the sidewalk 
and into the gutter~ 
A. If it is sewer, bound to be-run street. 
Q. Well, I understand that that is Mr. Hayes' 
and Mr. Richards' theory, that the pipe under 
the sidewalk was blocked; but .all I am con-
cerned about is when there is ice collected 
on the sidewalk under the drain pipe and it 
melts, it runs across the sidewalk and into the 
gutter, doesn't it~ Isn't that a fact 1 
A. Spreads all over. 
Q. Spreads all over1 
A. Spreads." 
There was no evidence of any kind submitted to the 
Jury which would be the basis for a finding that Mr. 
Milligan, in observing the sidewalk, could have, as result 
of his observations, a,scertain the fact that Mr. Geros 
says existed. Assuming for the purpose of this argument 
that Geros' testimony is correct and that both ~1:illigan 
and Johnson are in error as to the amount of ice that 
was on the sidewalk. A person walking on the sidewalk is 
not required to see everything that could be observed. 
Mr. Geros conducted an expedition to measure the ice 
on the sidewalk. Milligan stated that there was a slight 
skiff of snow, and that the skiff of snow appeared to hin1 
to cover the whole sidewalk and that he walked on an 
area where it appeared that he could safely walk. 
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There is not the slightest amount of evidence con-
tradictory to his statement. No person testified that this 
appearance did not exist, or that a reasonably prudent 
person walking along the same area would not likewise 
have thought as he thought that he could safely walk 
where he walked. 
It is respectfully submitted that plaintiff was not 
negligent as a Inatter of law and that there was no evi-
dence from which the Jury could have found that he did 
not exercise that degree of care which an ordinary pru-
dent pers·on, under all the circumstances, would have 
exercised. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND 
ABuSED HIS DISCRETION IN SUBMITTING THE SPECIAL 
VERDICT TO THE JURY. 
Plaintiff objected to the Court subn1itting the case 
to the .Jury on a Special Yerdict. Special Yerdict form 
was not requested hy the defendant but was giYen to the 
jury solely upon the Court's own responsibility. 
rrhe Hta tute .a llo\Y~ special yerdicts as a Inatter of 
di~erdion on the part of the court. Abuse of this dis-
cretion would, it is respectfully subn1itted, n1erit a re-
Y<'r~:d of the rasp now before the Court. 
':Plw <'<1:->P sulnnitted to the Jury \\·as not one of a 
<'OIIlpli<'atPd natun' with nu1nbers of factual propositions 
to he rldenninerl whieh could not be adequately and fully 
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understood by the Jury. The case is one of the kind which 
is normally submitted to juries for general verdicts. 
The purpose of the trial court in declining to submit 
the case to the Jury on a general verdict was to restrict 
the normal functions of the Jury. He intended to cut 
down the realm in which the Jury historically, constitu-
tionally and properly operates. 
There has, during the past years among legal schol-
ars, developed a very serious dispute concerning the 
value of special verdicts and interrogatories as against 
the use of the general verdict. Chief .among the propon-
ents of restricting the realm in which the jury is per-
mitted to operate is Judge Frank, one of the United 
States Circuit Court Justices. He is joined in his cam-
paign to restrict the Jury in its function by several re-
spectable legal scholars who candidly state that they 
have no confidence in the Jury System of deciding factual 
matters and that as a consequence the Jury should be 
restricted in its functions. They recognize the impossi-
bility of obtaining sufficient public support to abolish 
trial by jury and so seek by indirection to destroy a right 
held dear by all. See Moore Federal Practice, 2nd Ed. 
Vol. 5, Section 49.05, p. 2212 for a scholarly discussion 
of the dispute. 
Moore points out that answers to the questions such 
as were propounded and submitted to the Jury by the 
trial Court in the present cast throw no more light on 
what the Jury found as to the facts than would the gen-
eral verdict. He states: 
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"Like the general verdict answers to such 
questions are legal conclusions based on undis-
closed facts. Furthermore, such questions might 
confuse the jury and certainly would increase the 
possibility of error and clerical mistake. 
"The reason why it is not always feasible to 
plead f.acts apply also to the formulation of ques-
tions of fact to be submitted to the jury." (p. 2217) 
This Court, in a very recent case, discussed an in-
stance of the jury's intentions and desires being defeated 
by special verdicts they did not understand. See Cooper 
v. Evans, 1 U 2d 68,262 P. 2d 278. 
Moore concludes as follows concerning this attempt 
by certain radical elements to abolish or restrict the use 
of the general verdict : 
"Also, the general verdict, at times, achieves 
a triumph of justice over law. The Jury is not, 
nor should it become, a scientific fact finding body. 
Its chief value is that it applies the 'law,' often-
times a body of technical and refined theoretical 
principle.s and son1eti.J.nes edged with harshness, 
in an earthy fashion that comport~ with 'justice' 
as conceived bv the Inasses. for whom after all 
the law is 1naii:tly Ineant to serve. The general 
YPrdict i~ the answer frmn the 1nan in the street. 
If on occasion the trial judge thinks the jury 
should lw quizzed about its overall judgment a~ 
evidenef'd hy the general verdict, this can be done 
hy intPrrogatories accmnpanying the general ver-
dict. Hut if there is suffieient 12vidence to get b~­
a nwtion for directed verdict, then the problem 
is usually best solvPd by an ovt>rall, conunon judg-
Inent of the jurors-the general verdict. 
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"The general verdict is not simply a device 
for defeating logic and the law. It is a medium 
through which the people effectively express thenl-
selves and individually participate in their gov-
ernment. While the special verdict does not con-
stitute an infringement of the constitutional guar-
antee of a jury trial it is .a mode of quizzing the 
jury, and a means of limiting the role of juries 
in the administration of justice. The general ver-
dict is founded upon faith in the judgment of 
felloWinen. Furthermore the notion that issues 
of 'fact' are easily framed is unsound." 
Two of the greatest scholars that American Juris-
prudence has known have also, in published articles, 
commented upon the drive being made to restrict and 
ultimately abolish trial by jury. 
"See Wigmore, A Program For the Trial of a 
.Jury Trial (1929) 12 Am. Jud. Soc. 166, 170: 'Law 
and Justice are from time to time inevitably in 
conflict. That is because law is a general rule 
(even the stated exceptions to the rules .are gen-
eral exceptions) ; while justice is the fairness of 
this precise case under all its circumstances. And 
as a rule of law only take account of broadly typi-
cal conditions, and is aimed on average results, 
law and justice every so often do not coincide. 
Everybody knows this, .and can supply instances. 
But the trouble is that Law cannot concede ·it. 
Law-the-rule-must be enforced-the exact terms of 
the rule, justice or no justice ... Now this is where 
the jury comes in. The jury, in the privacy of its 
retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to the 
justice of the particular case. Thus the odium of 
inflexible rules of law is avoided, and popular 
satisfaction is preserved. . . . That is what jury 
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trial does. It supplies that flexibility of legal 
rule.s which is essential to justice and popular 
contentment. And that flexibility could never be 
given by judge trial. The judge (as in a chancery 
case) must write out his opinion, declaring the law 
and the findings of fact. He c.annot in this public 
record deviate one jot from those requirements. 
The jury, and the secrecy of the jury room, are 
the indispensable elements in popular justice.' 
"See Pound, Law in Books and Law in Ac-
tion (1910) 44 Am. L. Rev. 12, 18: 'Jury lawless-
ness is the great corrective of law in its actual 
administration. The will of the state at large 
imposed on a reluctant community, the will of a 
majority imposed on a vigorous and determined 
minority, find the same obs.tacle in the local jury 
that formerly confronted kings and ministers ... ~' 
Frmn an exmnination of the authorities .and the 
experience in the case now before this Court, it would ap-
pear that while this Court is strongly committed to the 
preserTation of the jury trial and to its pron1otion in all 
of its historic and constitutional range, son1e of the 
trial courts are equally conunitted to the encroachn1ent 
upon the constitutional right of trial by Jury to the point 
where, ultin1ately~ that right will becmue weak. puny and 
ineffectual. 
This Court, in Stickle Y. Uniou Pacific Rail road Co., 
] 22 U. 477. :2rll P. 2d 867, dearl~~. unequivocally and in 
language ·whiell eould not be rnisunderstood, reaffirmed 
itH position in regards jury trial and the protection of 
it in all of its .aspects: 
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"In our democratic system, the people are 
the repository of power whence the law is derived; 
from its initiation and creation to its final appli,. 
cation and enforcement, the law is the expression 
of their will. The functioning of a cross-section 
of the citizenry as a jury is the method by which 
the people express this will in the application of 
law to controversies which arise under it. Both 
our constitutional and statutory provisions assure 
trial by jury to citizens of this state. 
"Courts, as final arbiters of law, could arro-
gate to themselves arbitrary and dangerous 
powers by presuming to determine questions of 
fact which litigants have a right to have passed 
upon by juries. Part of the merit of the jury sys-
tem is its s.afeguarding against such arbitrary 
power in the courts. T,o the great credit of the 
courts of this country, they have been extremely 
reluctant to infringe upon this right, and by leav-
ing it unimpaired have kept the administration of 
justice close to the people. Of course, the rights 
of litigants should not be surrendered to the arbi-
trary will of juries without regard to whether 
there is a violation of legal rights as ,a basis for 
recovery. The Court does have a duty and a re-
sponsibility of supervisory control over the action 
of juries which is just as essential to the proper 
administration of justice as the function of the 
jury itself. Nevertheless, we remain cognizant of 
the vital importance of the privilege of trial h~r 
jury in our system of justice and deem it our duty 
to zealously protect and preserve it." 
It is respectfully submitted that this type of legal 
action is not one which is susceptible to the use of special 
verdicts or special interrogatories. That the obvious 
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purpose of the trial court without request by any party 
and over the protest of plaintiff in submitting special 
verdicts was to restrict the constitutional right of the 
plaintiff to a trial by jury. If this court approves the 
trial court's conduct in this respect, further inroads on 
the constitutional rights of the citizens of the State of 
Utah will be inevitable. Eventually the right of trial by 
jury will be eroded away until it will be insignificant, 
unimportant and may vanish completely. If the jury 
trials are to be .abolished, certainly it should be directly, 
openly, honestly and fairly, and not by indirection and 
erosion. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully .submitted that this Court should: 
1. Order the trial court to enter judgment in favor 
of plaintiff and against the defendant £,or the sum of 
$6,123.00 or, 
2. If it is determined that the answers to questions 
3 and 4 are inconsistent that the case be returned for a 
new trial. 
Respeetfull~- subn1itted, 
KTKO ~\~D HUGHES 
By: ] hVIGHT L. KiNG 
Attonzcys .for Plaintiff' and 
Appellant. 
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